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2. What is not a contempt.
As illustrating the nature of this offence, it may be well to refsr
to various decisions as to what is not a contempt, which establish
exceptions to the general rule.
For a bare non-feasance in not performing the command of the
first writ in any case whatsoever, "the court do not usually pro-
ceed to punish for a contempt :" 2 Hawk. P. C. 221.
"An attachment will not be granted, where the offence is not
strictly an offence to the court, nor where there is another remedy,
unless that remedy be difficult to obtain :" Comyn's Dig., Attach-
ment (A 3). A rescous is no contempt, when the matter on which
process is grounded is one of which the court had no cognisance:
Sparks v. Martin, Vent. 1; or the order disobeyed was beyond
their jurisdiction: People v. O'Neill, 47 Cal. 109. A contempt
for acting against an erroneous order of court will be discharged:
Vin. Abr., Contempt, c. 14. Where the court had no jurisdiction
of the cause, their order is void, and disobedience of it is no con-
tempt: People v. Sturtevant, 5 Seld. 263. See also Bex v.
"lement, 4 B. & Ald. 218.
The rule for an attachment was discharged, the offence being
indictable at common law: In re Lucas Hirst et al., 9 Phila. 216.
See, also, 1 Tidd's Pr., 3 Am. ed., 88; In re -, 3 Nev. &
Perry 389.
Where, in pursuance of a decree of the Supreme Court of the
United States, an injunction had been issued forbidding the re-
VOL. XXI.-19 (145)
146 CONTEMPT OF COURT.
building of a bridge, and subsequent to the decree, but before the
injunction, an Act of Congress had been passed making lawful
such rebuilding, a majority of the court held that the re-erection
of the bridge, in disobedience of the injunction, was not a con-
tempt: State of Pennsylvania v. Wheeling Bridge Co., 18 How.
421.
On the ground of public policy, the governor of the Common-
wealth (and it would seem the secretary also) is not compellable in his
official capacity to appear in court, in obedience to a subpena duces
tecum, or to give his deposition under a rule of court, and the
refusal to do so is not a contempt: Gray v. Pentland, 2 S. & R.
23 (1815). It is no contempt to refuse to answer in a proceeding
before a justice, who, under the Michigan statutes, bad no jurisdic-
tion thereof nor right to issue a subpoena and compel witnesses 
to
attend and testify: In re Morton, 10 Mich. 208. See, also, Bear
v. Cohen, 65 N. C. 511. Nor before a grand jury, when such
refusal is the assertion of a constitutional right; in such case 
the
commitment for contempt is illegal, and may be examined in 
the
Supreme Court by certiorari, even if not on a habeas corpus. 
This
was under the New York statutes: People v. Kelly, 24 N. Y. 74.
An attorney advised his client, who was under indictment for
assault and battery, if he could not procure a continuance to escape
and forfeit his recognisance, which would work a continuance.
Hfeld, that he was not guilty of contempt of court in giving such
advice, and if fined therefor that he could have a writ of error:
Ingle v. The State, 8 Blackf. 574. A mere omission to plead,
except where the object of the bill is to compel an answer, is no
contempt in Minnesota: Perrin v. Oliver, 1 Minn. 202. Reading
an affidavit for a change of venue, on the ground of prejudice in
the mind of the judge, is not a contempt of the court to which it
is presented: -Ex parte Curtis, 3 Minn. 274. It is no contempt
in a witness to leave court when permitted by the party summon-
ing him, and the costs of the attachment will not be put on him:
State v. Nixon, Wright (Ohio) 763. If the order of the court
disobeyed were doubtful, or could be construed in any way 
con-
sistent with innocence of intention on the part of the violator, 
the
court should not punish for contempt: Weeks v. Smith, 3 Abb.
P. R. 211. Under the statutes of New York, it is not 
a con-
tempt for a witness to refuse to answer before a justice of 
the
peace: Rutherford v. ffolmes, 5 Hun 317.
CONTEMPT OF COURT.
Some interesting cases have ariseu under the United States
Internal Revenue Acts, as regards how far disobedience to the
requirements of the supervisors will constitute a contempt which
a couri of the United States can punish. It has been decided that
an attachment will not be granted on the application of a super-
visor, where his proceedings had been marked by undue haste, had
been rather unreasonable, and the respondents were refused their
reasonable request to consult counsel before obeying his order:
United States v. ,Stanwood, 13 Int. Rev. Rec. 77, and other cases
in Bright. Dig. Fed. Dec., Supp., tit. Contempt.
3. Of direct and constructive contempts, and the general pro-
ceedings in case of contempt.
Contempts are again divided into direct and constructive or
consequential contempts : the first being those which are committed
in the presence of the court or by disobedience of its orders or
process, &c.; 'which openly insult or resist the powers of the
court or the persons of the judges" (even though not in court. See
Charlton's Case, 2 Myl. & Cr. 316; Com. v. Dandridge, 2 Va.
Cases 408); the second, those which are not so committed and do
not involve such direct disobedience, but "plainly tend to create a
universal disregard of their authority :" 4 Blk. 283; these depend
solely on evidence and are inferences from facts, an example of
which last are improper publications reflecting on the court, abus-
ing parties, &c.: 4 Blk. 286; 2 Hawk. 206; Hummel's Case,
9 Watts 421; Watson v. Citizens' S. Bank, 3 S. Car. 164.
Contempts in presence of a court by violence, insulting language,
&c., are sometimes termed criminal contempts: Androscoggin ,
K. Railroad Co. v. Androscoggin Railroad Co., 49 Maine 400.
From this distinction between contempts in facie eurmn and
those not, arises a difference in the method of procedure thereon.
A direct contempt which is committed in presence of the court, it
will of its own motion notice and punish summarily, those not so
committed, as well as constructive contempts, must be brought before
the court by affidavits of persons who witnessed them, and there-
upon a rule is made on the offender to appear and answer, or a
rule to show cause why an attachment should not issue against
him, "or in very flagrant instances of contempt, the attachment
issues in the first instance, as for contemptuous expressions of the
court:" 4 Blk. 287 ; 2 Hawk 222; 1 Tidd's Pr., 3d Am. ed. 88;
In re Judson, 3 Blatch. C. C. Rep. 148 ; 6 Dane Abr. 528, ch. 193,
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art. 28; 7 Id. 307--8, ch. 220, art. 5; Commonwealth v. Dan
dridge, 2 Va. Cases 408; State v. Mather, 37 N. H. 450; Clay's
Case, Pr. Dec. 221; Crow v. State, 24 Texas 12. And even
some constructive contempts, the court will take notice of, and
punish of its own motion: Ex parte Steinman et al., 9 Weekly
Notes of Cases 145, Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. To award
the attachment is at the discretion of the judge, and may be
awarded on his own knowledge, or a bare suggestion: Comyn's
Dig. Attach. (A. 1.) The process of attachment is only to bring the
party into court; when brought in, either by attachment, or the
rule to appear, or the rule to show cause, he is committed or bailed
-that he may answer on oath, interrogatories in the nature of a
charge or accusation, touching the alleged contempt. "1 If the
party can clear himself upon oath, he is discharged, but if per-
jured, may be prosecuted for perjury." The object of process of
contempt is to bring in the offender and proceed with him; it is
indispensable that the accused be arrested or summoned, except in
case of contempt in facie curi.
If a mere acknowledgment of the fact of contempt will give the
court all needful information (as in the case of a rescous) the
defendant may be admitted to make such acknowledgment and
receive his judgment, without answering interrogatories; "but if
he wilfully and obstinately refuses to answer, or answers in an
evasive manner, he is then guilty of a high and repeated contempt:"
4 Blk. 287; United States v. Dodge, 2 Gall. 813. If he confess
part of the contempt alleged and deny part, the court will not
discharge him, but will examine further as to the whole, and inflict
such punishment as may seem proper: 2 Hawk. P. C. 207, n. 1.
Persons guilty of contempt can be arrested at any time there-
after when they come within the jurisdiction of the court: Bow-
ery's Bank v. Bichards, 6 Thompson (N. Y.) 59; 3 Hun 366.
Even though the contempt were committed out of the jurisdiction:
1 Burr's Trial 352.
Where a contempt is committed in the presence of the court,
the court has immediate jurisdiction of the person of the offender,
and although he leaves the court-room and absconds before any
action had, yet the court may in his absence sentence him for con-
tempt, and may do it within any reasonable time before the end
of the term, and without process issued for his arrest. And in
case of such contempt the offender may be instantly apprehended
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and imprisoned at the discretion of .the court: Middlebrook v.
State, 43 Conn. 257; 4 Blk. 287.
In cases of contempt the party must appear in proper person
and not by attorney :V Yin. Abr. Contempt, F 7; Com. Dig.
Attorney, B 6; People v. Wilson, 64 Ill. 195; Vertner v. Martin,
10 Sm. & M. 103. And it has been held in Alabama that he has
no constitutional or statutory right to be heard by counsel in the
matter of the contempt: Ex parte Hamilton, 51 Ala. 66 (1874).
Nor under the Constitution of the United States has he any right
to a trial by a jury: Hollingsworth v. Duane, Wall. 77. See also
Res v. Oswald, 1 Dall. 319. There are like decisions in several of
the states: see infra, II.
But the arrest and imprisonment must be made by some warrant,
mittimus, or act of record, a copy of which ought to be given to
the officer committing the offender, for his security: 6 & 7 Dane's
Abr., supra.
Where the sentence of the court adjudicates the contempt, setting
forth the facts, a warrant is not essential-an order of court is suf-
ficient: Regina v. Wilson, 51 E. C. L. Rep. 619. So, too, if the
contempt be committed in the presence of the court an order is
sufficient: 8 Conn. 379; 2 Daly (N. Y.) 530. But a justice of
the peace cannot commit for a contempt without a warrant in
writing: Mayhew v. Locke, 2 Marshall 377; s. c. 7 Taunt. 63.
In a commitment for contempt by a superior court it is not
necessary to set out on the warrant the cause of commitment;
contra, as to an inferior court, "to which credit is not to be given
for conforming itself to the appointed limits of its jurisdiction,"
and whose proceedings must therefore be set forth to show that
they are regular and authorized: .Ex parte Fernandez, 10 C. B.
(N. S.) 3, 40. See also Doyle v. -Falconer, Law Rep., 1 P. C.
328; 2 Hawk. P. C. 168; Bac. Abr., Courts, D 2; statute 13
Car. II, s. 2, c. 2.
On a habeas corpus and certiorari from the King's Bench to
Quarter Sessions the return was for contemptuous words; per cur.
held ill, for it should express what were the words: Vin. Abr.,
Contempt [C] 3.
But, "if a warrant be made out stating the facts, and showing
on the face of it that the alleged contempt was no contempt in
point of law, that warrant would no doubt be bad :" Ex parte
Fernandez, supra 58. Even the warrant of a superior court if it
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show on its face want of jurisdiction would be bad: Howard v.
Gossett, 10 Ad. & E. N. S. 859; Carus Wilson's Case, 7 Id. 1018.
Blackstone thinks that this method of making a defendant
answer on oath to a criminal charge, so contrary "to the genius
of the common law," was derived from courts of equity, and he
notes a very important difference between the proceedings in con-
tempt in the courts of law and equity, viz., that when in a court
of equity the party has answered the interrogatories on oath, "his
answer may be contradicted and disproved by affidavits of the
adverse party," whereas in courts of law, "if he clears himself by
his answers the complaint is totally dismissed;" although as we
have seen if the accused have sworn falsely he may be prosecuted
for perjury; and this method of procedure is as old as the process
of attachment: 4 Blk. 288. See also Comyn's Dig., Chancery, D
3 ; Thomas, Lessee, v. Cummins, 1 Yeates 40; Whittem v. State,
36 Ind. 196; Buck v. Buck, 60 Ill. 105; Stuart v. People, 3
Scam. 395; United States v. Dodge, 2 Gall. 313; Cartwright's
Case, 114 Mass. 230. Process of contempt in chancery has in
England been regulated by a number of modern statutes: see 11
Geo. IV. & 1 Win. IV., 4 c. 36; 2 & 3 Win. IV., c. 58; 23 & 24
Win. IV., c. 149.
In cases of contempt by an inferior court in usurping jurisdiction,
"it seems to be rather the more usual way, first to award a writ of
prohibition to such court, and afterwards an attachment upon its
proceeding after such prohibition :" 2 Hawk. P. C. 217; Begin
v. Lefroy, 8 Queen's Bench 134; 4 Moak 250.
An attachment for contempt is a criminal proceeding: Com.
Dig., Attachment, A 4; 4 Blk. 288; Hummel's Case, 9 Watts
421; Cartwright's Case, 114 Mass. 230. Proceedings for con-
tempt are criminal in their nature, the United States being
plaintiff: Durant v. Supervisors, 1 Woolworth 377. Whence it
seems to result that a commitment in contempt is a commitment
in execution: Kearney's Case, 7 Wheat. 38.
As regards the question whether or not a person committed can
be admitted to bail much conflict of authority exists. There is a
case where a person committed by the Court of Quarter Sessions
for refusing to be sworn as a witness before a grand jury, was
brought before the King's Bench on habeas corpus, and HOLT, C.
J., said: " it was a great contempt, and that, had he been there
he would have fined him and committed him till he paid the fine.
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but being otherwise he was bailed." Rex v. Lord Preston, 1 Salk.
278. See also Chambers's Case, Cro. Car. 183.
The sheriff may take a bail-bond on an attachment, but cannot
oblige the prosecutor to accept it: Vin. Abr., Bail, pl. 24; Rex
v. Daws, 2 Salk. 608. But another case is cited in Viner, where
the contrary is held, that the sheriff cannot take a bail-bond on an
attachment for a contempt, for it is not within the words or intent
of statute 23 Henry VI., and judgment accordingly: Id., pl. 29,
citing Field v. Workhouse, Comyn 264, Case 145. The statute
13 Car. II., s. 2, c. 2, provides that on attachments for contempt
security shall be taken for appearance therein, "as hath been here-
tofore used."
"A person committed for contempt cannot be bailed:" Ex parte
Alexander, 2 Am. Law Reg. 44. "No court can discharge or
bail a person that is in execution by the judgment of any other
court :" DE GRAY, C. J., Crosby's Case, 3 Wilson 199. But it
has been done in case of commitments by an inferior court: C/ian-
cey's Case, 12 Rep. 82; and in Yates's Case, the court wishing to
consider (4 Johns. 317), though the commitment here was not by
an inferior court.
A commitment for contempt is equivalent to a commitment in
execution: Hurd on Hab. Corp. 415 n:; Crosby's Case, supra, 188;
.Kearney's Case, 7 Wheat. 38.
II. OF THE PUNISHMENT FOR CONTEMPT.
1. Kind and degree thereof at common law.
All courts of record can punish contempts by fine and imprison-
ment at discretion, or sometimes even by a "corporal or infamous
punishment:" 2 Hawk. 4, sect. 15; 4 Bl. 287. Of this latter
sort of punishment I find no instance in this country, and the case
cited by Blackstone (supra), in support of his statement regarding
its existence, is Royson's Case, Cro. Car. 146, about 1625. Royson
offered himself as bail in an action and made oath that he pos-
sessed the necessary qualifications. On examination he confessed
that he had not these qualifications and had perjured himself, and
on further examination of "this misdemeanor," that he had more-
over in like manner been bail in other actions and sworn falsely.
For "this cause" he was adjudged to be committed to prison and
to stand upon the pillory.
In a very old case of a very outrageous contempt, it was debated
whether the offender should not lose his hand: Vin. Abr., Con-
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tempt, A, pl. 6, citing Brook's Abr., Contempt, pl. 9. In the
case of the Lord Mayor of London (1771), 3 Wilson 202, Lord
C. J. DE GRAY mentions that the Court of Common Pleas, not
long since, sentenced a man to stand in the pillory for contempt.
See also .Ex parte Alexander, 2 Am. Law Reg. 44, 57; Re .Hirst
et al., 9 Phila. 216.
For any direct and positive contempt a defendant may be -orn.
mitted during the pleasure of the court; for disobedience of an
order, till he obey: Yin. Abr., Contempt, B 21; stat. I Anne, c.
6; Tome's Appeal, 50 Penn. St. 285.
A witness refusing to answer, may be committed till he answer:
Lott v. Burrel, 2 Rep. Con. Ct. 167 ; People v. Phelps, 4 Thomp-
son (N. Y.) 467.
Commitment till the further order of the court is good: Yates's
Case, 4 Johns. 317 ; Williamson's Case, 26 Penn. St. 24 ; Tome's
Appeal, 50 Id. 285. Contra, In re Alexander, 2 Am. Law Reg.
44; Matter of Hammel, 9 R. I. 248.
If the fine for contempt be not paid, the party may be committed
to prison: People v. Bennett, 4 Paige 282.
In the Court of Chancery, if a defendant in a bill do not appear,
a sequestration will go against his real and personal estate till he
purge his contempt: Vin. Abr., Contempt, B 20, C 6.
Where the imprisonment is designed only as a punishment, and
not as a means of compelling obedience, like a sentence, it should
be certain and be for a definite period: In re Crawford, 13 Ad. &
E. 613, citing Rex v. James, 5 B. & Ald. 894; Birkley v. Com-
monwealth, 2 J. J. Marsh. 575; Ex parte Alexander, supra;
Commonwealth v. Roberts, 2 Clark (Pa.) 340.
Where a party is ordered to pay a sum of money, and committed
by way of enforcing such order, the commitment is in the nature
of a eapias ad satisfaciendum, and if unable to pay, the party
may be discharged as insolvent. But he cannot be discbarged on
this ground where his contempt is wilful; he is then in the posi-
tion of one fined on conviction of a criminal offence: Matter of
Watson, 3 Lansing 408 (1870).
Of a fine for contempt to a rule of court, the injured party can
have but a third part: HOLT, C. J., in Rex v. (udmore, Comb.
250, cited in Yin. Abr., Contempt, B 24.
A fine imposed by court for contempt, is a punishment for a
wrong to the state, and goes to it, not to a party to the suit, pend-
ing which the contempt was committed: Matter of Rhodes, 65 N.
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C. 518; Morris v. Whitehead, Id. 637. But where the statutes
of Michigan order the payment to an injured party, the imposition
of a criminal fine in addition is unlawful: Raines v. Haines, 35
Mich. 138.
A contempt against a court of the United States is a contempt
against the United States, and the court cannot, because an
offender is unable to pay, either discharge him or remit the pen-
alty, his case being subject to the pardoning power vested exclu-
sively by the Constitution in the President: .Ex parte .Kearney,
7 Wheat. 38; 3 Opinions Att.-Gen. U. S. 622; 4 Id. 458; 5
Id. 579; Re Aullee, 7 Blatch. 23. See also State v. Sauvinet,
24 La. Ann. 119.
In Re Mullee, 7 Blatch. 23, the offender had been fined and
committed till payment thereof. The court held that the offence
was none the less a contempt, the punishment for which could be
remitted by the President of the United States alone, in that the
fine had been ordered by the court to be paid to the opposite party,
to reimburse his expenses in the attachment proceedings, and a
vested private right in shape of a judgment had thence accrued.
An application to the president for pardon had been denied, but
Judge BLATCHFORD still refused to discharge the applicant on the
ground of his inability to pay the fine, "at least until the execu-
tive disclaims its power to relieve the party by a pardon ;" inti-
mating that in such case the matter might again be brought before
him.
A contempt against a federal court being a crime, may be prose-
cuted by indictment or information as a misdemeanor: United
States v. Jacobi, 14 Int. Rev. Rec. 45.
The summary punishment for contempt is not an infringement
of the state constitution, which guarantees to the citizen a trial by
jury: State v. Doty, 32 N. J. L. 403. There are like decisions
in New Hampshire: State v. Matthews, 37 N. H. 450; New
York: Patrick v. Warner, 4 Paige 897; People v. Bennett, Id.
282; Arkansas: .Neel v. State, 4 Eng. 259; Iowa: .E parte
Grace, 12 Iowa 208; and in Minnesota, where it is further held
that the statutes abolishing imprisonment for debt do not apply in
cases of contempt: State v. Becht, 23 Minn. 411. On the last
point, in Pennsylvania, see Tome's Appeal, 50 Penn. St. 297
The privilege of a member of Parliament is no protection in case
of a criminal contempt; for instance, carrying off a ward of chan-
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cery and refusing to inform the court of her whereabouts. The
offender was committed to the Fleet, "till he shall clear his con-
tempt." A committee of the House of Commons decided that this
claim of privilege ought not to be admitted: Long Wellesle/'s
Case, 2 Russ. & Myl. 639.
A barrister and member of Parliament, for writing an insulting
and threatening letter to a master in chancery, was ordered by the
lord chancellor to be committed to the Fleet. He evaded 
arrest
till Parliament met, was then arrested and the House 
of Commons
decided that his privilege did not protect him: Charlton's 
Case, 2
Mlyl. & Cr. 316.
Nor will the privileges of a member of Parliament protect 
from
imprisonment for a gross contempt of court, which in this 
case con-
sisted in making public speeches abusing the lord chief 
justice:
Beg. v. Onslow J" Whalley, 12 Cox Cr. Cases 359 (1873). 
This
was in connection with the Tichborne Case, and for a 
subsequent
and like contempt, a barrister was fined 5001. and sentenced 
to
three months' imprisonment, and the claimant, who 
had offended
in a less degree, was ordered to find security for his good 
behavior:
Tichborne Oase, 370-1.
Proceeding pending or not.
Most cases of contempt, other than those in faeie eurice, 
arise
in a proceeding pending in court, or are connected therewith, 
and
it is questioned whether this be not an essential condition 
to the
existence of this power, the reasons for which view are set 
forth in
Be Pryor, 18 Kansas 72. See also Robertson v. Bingley, 1 
Mc-
Cord Ch. 333, 349; Hurd on Hab. Corp. 410, &c.; Rex v. 
Cle-
ment, 4 B. & Ald. 218.
Where the proceeding is discontinued, the person committed for
contempt in not answering as a witness should be discharged, 
as
he can no longer purge his contempt: In re Hall, 10 
Mich. 210.
But it was held in Johnson v. Wideman, Dudley (So. C.) 70 (1837),
that a witness may be committed for contempt even 
though the
case be terminated before the attachment be moved 
for. Mr.
Bishop (2 Cr. Law, sects. 259, 262) agrees with this 
view, holding
that the rule cannot be without exception, and that there 
may be
circumstances in which a court of justice should exercise 
the power
after the termination of the cause. For this he cites a number 
of
cases.
If the matter has been decided, it seems that in England 
send-
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ing an insulting or threatening letter to a judge would not be pun-
ishable as a contempt: Beg. v. Faulkner, 2 M. & A. 311; Cases
in Bane 343. Nor to criticise in a newspaper the ruling of a
judge in a case not pending. Contra, if pending: State v. Ander-
son, 40 Iowa 207.
The resignation of his office by an officer of the court, does not
oust the court of jurisdiction to proceed against him by attachment
for contempt for any acts of misconduct committed by him while
in office: The Laurens, 1 Abb. Adm. 508; see also People v.
Pearson, 3 Scam. 189.
2. Avoidance of the penalty or purging the contempt.
Although a contempt have been committed, it may sometimes be
purged by the submission of the offender, in which case the court
will forbear to inflict a penalty therefor. But an unwilling com-
pliance with a decree of a' court of equity, after service of a writ
of attachment for refusing to obey, will not purge the contempt:
S nowman v. Harford, 57 Me. 397. That a party acted under the
advice of counsel, is only a mitigation of the contempt: Colum-
bia W. P. v. Columbia, 4 Rich. N. S. 388. But where he does not
give the name of the counsel, or alleges that he was advised and
believed that the court had no jurisdiction of the matter enjoined,
this is no mitigation: People v. Compton, 1 Duer (N. Y.) 512.
That no contempt of court was intended may excuse the offender.
especially when the contempt is only constructive, but the nature
of the act is chiefly regarded. "As regards the question whether a
contempt has or has not been committed, it does not depend upon
the intention of the party, but upon the act he has done :" TANEY,
C. J., in Wartman v. Wartman, Taney 362, 370. See also Peo-
ple v. Few, 2 Johns. 290; Matter of Moore et als., 63 N. C. 397.
Where an injunction is disobeyed, the motive or intent in so
doing does not, as a rule, alter the responsibility: High on Injunc-
tions 498.
Some contempts, it is worthy of notice, belong to that class of
offences, of rare occurrence, which are constituted by the mental
action or state of feeling of the person committing them, being
evidenced only by physical acts and manifestations, which latter
are held guilty or guiltless according to the character of the motive
confessed or denied. A very strong case, where innocence of inten-
tion was held to excuse an offender, is the Matter of Fitton, 16
How. Pr. 303, where a police officer, having in charge a prisoner,
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brought him up on a writ of habeas corpus, and made return that
he had no opposition to his discharge, and no further return'to
make; whereupon the prisoner was discharged. The officer imme-
diately re-arrested him in the court-room, without any warrant or
process, and took him to prison on another charge. On a rule for
an attachment, the officer answered that he acted under the instruc-
tions and orders of one of the police commissioners, whom he sup-
posed it was his duty to obey, and that he intended no disobedience
of the orders of the court. Held. sufficient to relieve him from
the charge of contempt.
For contempt by a clerk of court in not making his return on a
writ of error, ignorance of the law is no excuse: State v. Sim-
mons, 1 Ark. 265. A declaration under oath by the parties
accused that they were ignorant that they were violating an
injunction of court, and a submission to the direction of the court,
will avail to purge the contempt by undoing or reversing the acts
complained of where practicable: Vose v. Reed, 1 Wood (Fla.)
647. But where an injunction has been violated, and no regret
for the wrong done or offer to repair it was made, a mere disavowal
of intentional contempt will not purge the contempt: Watson v.
Citizens' Saving Bank, 5 So. C. 159, 170. Contempt in not per-
forming a decree of court, may be purged by showing the party's
inability to do so: O' Callaghan v. O' Callaghan, 69 Ill. 554.
Words apparently scandalous or offensive, but susceptible of a
different construction may be explained by the speaker or writer,
and he be relieved of the charges of contempt, on sworn disavowal
of intent to commit it; but where the words are necessarily offen-
sive and insulting, such disavowal may excuse, but cannot justify:
Re Woolley, 11 Bush 95, 110 (1874); citing People v. Freer, I
Caines 484. A disclaimer of "intentional disrespect or design to
embarrass the administration of justice," is no excuse, where the
contrary would appear on a fair interpretation of the language
used: People v. Wilson, 64 Ill. 195.
"The party called before the court is made his own witness in
his own cause. If he be innocent he will have no trouble in dis-
claiming the contempt, and avowing his innocence. The question
is the quo animo. His purpose is known to himself, and he is per-
mitted to purge himself by his own avowal: Re Woolley, supra,
citing Mr. Wirt's argument in case of Judge Peck, before the
High Court of Impeachment.
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Where a party relies on an excuse, he must appear in court in
his own person: People v. Wilson, 64 Ill. 195; Vertner v. Mar-
tin, 10 Sm. & M. 103. See also Yin. Abr. Contempt (F) 7. A
stranger to a suit cannot purge himself of contempt in reference
to order or process made or issued therein, by showing that the
court had no jurisdiction, where the court is one of general juris-
diction and acts within it: Exparte Stickney, 40 Ala. 160, 169.
A party in contempt, until it be purged will not be allowed to ask
the favor of the court, nor take any aggressive measure against his
adversary, but he may protect himself, and make any motion
designed to show that an order adjudging him in contempt was
erroneous: Brinkley v. Brinkley, 47 N. Y. 40.
3. Of the penalty as a remedy for civil wrongs to another
person.
There are certain contempts, such as the disobedience of an order
of court for payment of costs, the non-performance of awards of
arbitrators, &c., the punishment for which is "to be looked on
rather as a civil execution for the benefit of the injured party,
though carried on in the shape of a criminal process for a contempt
of the authority of the court." For which reason being a civil
remedy they are not affected by a general act of pardon: 4 B1.
285; Buck v. Buck, 60 Ill. 105.
Contra as to the last point. In Be Mullee, 7 Blatch. 23. Per-
haps this last case may be distinguished on the ground that the
pardon there spoken of was special, not a general act of pardon.
The criterion for determining whether process for contempt is
civil or criminal may be stated thus:
"If the contempt consists in the refusal of a party to do some-
thing which he is ordered to do for the benefit or advantage of the
opposite party, the process is civil, and he stands committed till he
complies with the order. The order in such case is not punitive
but coercive." The private party alone is interested in its enforce-
ment, and when he is satisfied the imprisonment terminates: Phil-
lips v. Welch, 11 Nev. 187; citing 4 Bl., chap. 20. In.New York
the power to enforce a civil remedy by proceedings as for con-
tempt exists under 2 Rev. Stat. 534, 538; People v. Compton, 1
Duer 512; Ludlow v. Knox, Abb. App. Dec. 326.
Punishment of a party for contempt is sometimes a remedial pro-
cess to which the opposite party is entitled; though it may not be
necessary for the vindication of the authority of the court: Howard
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v. Durand, 36 Geo. 346. When used to enforce civil rights com-
mitmemt under attachment for disobedience of orders of court
is a civil remedy: Tome's Appeal, 50 Penn. St. 285. Where
the civil rights of a person are concerned, a mandamus may issue
from the Supreme Court to an inferior one to punish for contempt:
-Ex parte Chamberlain, 4 Cow. 49. See also Mining Co. v. Free-
mont, 7 Cal. 120. But the party against whom the attachment
issues, and who has committed a contempt is not entitled to costs,
it would be "contrary to all practice and precedent: Deeds v. Deeds,
1 Iowa 394. In an English case on rule nisi for attachment for
contempt in not appearing to a subpoena, which was discharged,
the accused having cleared himself of the comtempt, his costs were
refused him, there appearing to have been some "approximation,"
to the offence charged. For the injury done the plaintiff by the
noti-appearance of the defendant, he was remitted to his civil
remedy: Marshall v. The York N. B. Railroad Co., 18 Eng.
Law & Eq. 500. It would seem that if innocent of any contempt,
the costs should not be put on him. They were put on the party
applying for the attachment in such case in State v. Nixon, Wright
(Ohio) 763. A fine for contempt of an injunction may properly
include the plaintiff's costs and counsel fees incurred in consequence
of the defendant's resistance to the application for an attachment:
Doubleday v. Sherman, 8 Blatch. 45. But under the New York
statute, counsel fees so named cannot be so included; they may,
however, form part of the costs: People v. R. S. L. Railway Co.,
14 Hun 371 ; Van Valkenburgh v. Doolittle, 4 Abb. N. C. 72.
Where a man is fined for a contempt to a rule of the court, the
party aggrieved can have but a third part of the fine, and it must
be returned into the exchequer before lev. fac. : HOLT, J., in Rex
v. Cudmore, Comb. 250; Vin. Abr. CJontempt (B) 24. Under the
statutes of Michigan, where the court in a proceeding for contempt,
order the payment of money to an injured party the imposition of
a criminal fine in addition is unlawful: Haines v. Haines, 35
Mich. 138.
It has been held in the District Court of the United States for
the Southern District of New York, that where an injunction has
been violated, it is no less a punishment for contempt and as such
within the pardoning power of the President of the United States,
because the fine therefor had been ordered by the court to be paid
to the opposite party to reimburse his expenses in the proceedings
